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Abstract
Asymmetries in cross-price elasticities have been demonstrated by several empirical
studies. In this paper we study from a theoretical stance how introducing asymmetry
in the substitution e¤ects inuences the sustainability of collusion. We character-
ize the equilibrium of a linear Cournot duopoly with substitute goods, and consider
substitution e¤ects which are asymmetric in magnitude. Within this framework, we
study partial collusion using Friedman (1971) solution concept. Our main result shows
that the interval of quantities supporting collusion in the asymmetric setting is always
smaller than the interval in the symmetric benchmark. Thus, the asymmetry in the
substitution e¤ects makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain. This implies that pre-
vious Antitrust decisions could be reversed by considering the role of this kind of
asymmetry.
Keywords: asymmetry, substitutes, Cournot duopoly, collusion, folk theorem.
JEL classication: C72, D43, L13.
1 Introduction
In this paper we study the sustainability of collusion in a Cournot duopoly where market
demands are asymmetric in the magnitude of substitution e¤ects. The evidence of asym-
metric cross-price elasticities is shown in several empirical studies (e.g. Berry et al., 1995;
Serthuraman et al., 1999; Kim and Cotterill, 2008; Rojas and Peterson, 2008). For exam-
ple, in Berry et al. (1995) the cross-price semi-elasticity between Nissan Sentra and Ford
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Escort is 1.375, while between Ford Escort and Nissan Sentra is 8.024; in the US market
for processed cheese Kim and Cotterill (2008) nd that the cross-price elasticity between
Weight Watchers and Kraft is 0.25, while between Kraft and Weight Watchers is 0.04; the
cross-price elasticity between Bud and Old Style is 0.003, while the cross-price elasticity
between Old Style and Bud is 0.242 (Rojas and Peterson, 2008); nally, in a meta-analysis
of 1060 cross-price e¤ects, 19 grocery product categories and 280 brands, Serthuraman et
al. (1999) provide an empirical generalization of this asymmetric price e¤ect. The evi-
dence supports the idea that in general cross-price elasticities are not symmetric, and this
fact is also compatible with a theoretical perspective, since aggregate market demands
need not satisfy any symmetry condition (see e.g. Diewert, 1980; Bonfrer et al. 2006),
and also at the individual level the Slutsky matrix need not be symmetric (because the
income e¤ect need not be symmetric).
In this paper we consider a linear duopoly model with Cournot competition and sub-
stitute products. We extend Singh and Vives (1984) by allowing for asymmetry in the
magnitude of the substitution e¤ects, deriving the equilibrium quantities, prices and prof-
its. We compare them to those in a symmetric equivalent duopoly setting, namely a
duopoly in which the substitution parameters are symmetric and equal to the average of
the parameters in the asymmetric case. Then, using the folk theorem solution concept
and the penal code according to Friedman (1971), we analyze partial collusion. We derive
the range of collusive quantities that makes the collusion sustainable for both rms, and
compare it to the symmetric equivalent case.
This paper adds the two following main contributions to the existing literature. First,
even though an extensive literature on collusion considers other kinds of asymmetries in
market demands and in the characteristics of rms (for an overview see e.g. Feuerstein,
2005), to the best of our knowledge, the e¤ect of asymmetric cross-price e¤ects on the
stability of collusion has not yet been studied from a theoretical stance. Our main result
shows that, given the discount rate of each rms, the interval of quantities which supports
the collusion is always smaller than in the symmetric equivalent case. Intuitively, if rms
are asymmetric the intervals of the quantities making the collusion stable are no longer
coincident, and the e¤ect of asymmetry is to shift each rms interval in opposite directions.
This happens since a high collusion quantity raises the relative value of the deviation
strategy for the weak rm, whose production decision is relatively more inuenced by
the other. Similarly, a low level of the collusion quantity makes the deviating behavior
more convenient for the strong rm. Only the intermediate levels of collusive quantity
are therefore supported by both rms. In this stylized setting, we thus conclude that
the asymmetry in the substitution e¤ect makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain. This
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implies that previous antitrust decisions could be reversed by considering the role of this
kind of asymmetry.
The second result is related to the characterization of the equilibrium in the asymmetric
Cournot duopoly. We nd that the rm whose price is relatively more inuenced by the
other rms production decisions sets a lower quantity, and sells at a lower price with
respect to the rival, getting lower prots. An intuition for this result is that, since the two
goods are strategic substitutes (but asymmetrically) the production decisions are driven
by the rm which is relatively less inuenced by the rival. The symmetric equivalent rm
equilibrium prices, prots and quantities lie between those of the strong and the weak
rm.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section we characterize the equilibrium
condition for the asymmetric Cournot duopoly and compare it to the symmetric equivalent
case. In the third section we derive the solution of the collusion supergame, and we
state the results on the implicit collusion stability. In the fourth section we draw the
nal remarks and directions for future theoretical and empirical research. The proofs are
relegated to the appendix.
2 A linear Cournot duopoly with asymmetric substitution
e¤ects
In this section we consider a Cournot duopoly which extends Singh and Vives (1984)
allowing for asymmetry in the magnitude of the substitution e¤ects. This extension does
not need any particular assumption, since market demands need not satisfy any symmetry
conditions such as those required by the Slutsky equation (see e.g. Diewert, 1980; Bonfrer
et al., 2006). Moreover, if the income e¤ect in the Slutsky equation is not symmetric,
the individual demands are not symmetric in the cross-price e¤ect as well. Mastroleo and
Savorelli (2010) show which class of individual utility functions underlies the asymmetry
in cross substitution e¤ects.
Let us consider a duopoly where rm i and rm j face the following inverse demand
function
pi = a  qi   biqj ; fi; jg = f1; 2g (1)
where bi 2 [0; 1]; a > 0 and qi;j  0:We normalize the own-price e¤ect to one, but this
is not going to a¤ect the results qualitatively. If bi 6= bj , we say that the demands are
asymmetric, and if bi = bj we say that they are symmetric. In a Cournot competition
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setting, each rm chooses the production quantity to maximize its prots as follows:
max
qi
i = (pi   c)qi (2)
where c is a constant marginal cost. The solution of the model leads to the equilibrium
quantities and prots
qCi =
(bi   2)(a  c)
bibj   4 (3)
Ci =
(bi   2)2(a  c)2
(bibj   4)2 (4)
C = i + j =
[(bi   2)2 + (bj   2)2](a  c)2
(bibj   4)2 : (5)
We assume henceforth that a > c to guarantee that the Cournot equilibrium quantities
are positive. To have an intuition about the strategic interaction driving the results, let
us consider the following best response functions:
qCi =
(a  c  biqCj )
2
(6)
qCj =
(a  c  bjqCi )
2
: (7)
By simple inspection it is immediately apparent that the two goods are strategic sub-
stitutes. Then, taking the cross derivative of each best response function leads to the
following Remark.
Remark 1 Consider dq
C
i
dqCj
=   bi2 and
dqCj
dqCi
=   bj2 , then:
1. if bi > bj ,
dqCi
dqCj
<
dqCj
dqCi
;
2. if bi < bj ,
dqCi
dqCj
>
dqCj
dqCi
:
The above Remark states that, if e.g. bi > bj ; an expansion in rm j production has
an impact on is quantity choice greater than the impact that an equivalent expansion
by i has on the quantity choice of j: For this reason, we call i the weak substitute and
j the strong substitute (and vice versa if bi < bj). Consistently, the strong substitute
produces a higher quantity and gets higher prots with respect to the weak. Henceforth,
the equilibrium results associated with the asymmetric demands will be denoted by the
superscript ASY:
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To allow for a comparison with the asymmetric setting, we exploit as benchmark
a special case of the symmetric setting, such that bi = bj =
bi+bj
2 : The substitution
parameters are chosen to be the mean of the parameters in the asymmetric case. We call
the benchmark setting a symmetric equivalent, and we denote the associated equilibrium
values by the superscript SE: In the symmetric equivalent case the solution of problem 2
is
qSEi = q
SE
j =
2(a  c)
4 + bi + bj
(8)
SEi =
4(a  c)2
(4 + bi + bj)2
: (9)
To provide an intuitive comparison, in Figure 1 we represent the asymmetric Cournot
equilibrium and its symmetric equivalent in the space of quantities when bj > bi:
C
SE
0
2
ca -
2
ca -
iq
jq
ji bb
ca
+
- )(2
ji bb
ca
+
- )(2
jb
ca -
jb
ca -
Figure 1
The best response functions are represented by the thick lines in the asymmetric case,
and by the thin straight lines in the symmetric equivalent. The SE equilibrium is North
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West of the asymmetric Cournot equilibrium, thus the weak substitute j produces a lower
quantity with respect to the SE case, and the strong substitute i a higher quantity. By
considering the two parabolas, representing the contour lines of the prot functions at the
Cournot equilibrium, it is straightforward to notice the asymmetry in the region of the
possible equilibria which are Pareto superior to the Cournot-Nash.
The following Proposition characterizes the solution to problem 2 with respect to the
equilibrium prices and the quantity levels, and compares them to the symmetric equivalent
case.
Proposition 1 Let qSEi = q
SE
j = q
SE and pSEi = p
SE
j = p
SE : Then the following holds:
1. bASYi > b
ASY
j () qASYi < qSE < qASYj ;
2. bASYi > b
ASY
j () pASYi < pSE < pASYj ;
3. bASYi > b
ASY
j () ASYi < SE < ASYj :
The above Proposition states that in the symmetric equivalent case quantities, prices,
and prots lie between the weak substitutes and the strong substitutes. The strate-
gic weakness thus leads to lower quantities, prices and prots with respect to both the
symmetric equivalent and the strong substitute.
3 Partial collusion
In this section we will investigate how asymmetry in substitutability a¤ects the stability
of collusion. As in the standard symmetric case, the implicit level of collusion should
not necessarily be the monopoly quantity. The reason is that there are innite quantities
higher than the monopoly one that still provide prots greater than in the Cournot game.
Moreover, as we will show in Remark 3, when the discount rate is su¢ ciently high the
monopoly quantity does not make the collusion stable. Given a common discount factor
; we study the minimum individual quantity produced by a rm that allows collusion to
be stable, and to what extent asymmetry inuences the stability of collusion.
We will proceed through the following steps. First, we will set up the Cournot su-
pergame and study the collusion and deviation strategies, nding the interval of quantities
for each rm that allows collusion to be sustainable. Second, we will state in Proposition
2 which is the interval of collusive quantities that makes collusion sustainable for both.
Finally, in Proposition 3 we will state our main result, showing whether asymmetry in
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the substitution e¤ects makes collusion easier with respect to the symmetric equivalent
benchmark.
Over an innite horizon, the two rms play grim trigger strategies in a Cournot su-
pergame  (1): We use the folk theorem solution concept according to Friedman (1971).
In the rst stage of the game, t = 0; the rms follow a collusive strategy  and maximize
the joint prots. In general, prots division is not equal. In the remaining time horizon, if
both the rms played the collusive strategy in the previous period, the rms continue to
play the collusive strategy : Otherwise, if at least one rm deviates from the collusive
strategy playing D, the rms play the Cournot-Nash strategy C .
We rst consider the collusive strategy . Since there are innite potential collusive
outcomes, we use joint-prot maximization as the selection criterion for the collusive
focal point (as in e.g. dAspremont et al., 1983; and in asymmetric environments, e.g.
Rothschild, 1999). Accordingly, we solve the following problem:
max
qi;qj
i + j (10)
which leads to the equilibrium quantities and prots:
qi = q

j =
a  c
2 + bi + bj
(11)
i =
(bj + 1)(a  c)2
(2 + bi + bj)2
: (12)
We can then state the following remark, which characterizes the joint-prot maximiza-
tion equilibrium.
Remark 2 When rm i and rm j maximize the joint prot, they produce the same
quantity, and the weak substitute obtains a level of prot lower than the strong.
The intuition for this Remark is that, since the two rms are technologically symmetric,
when maximizing the joint prot they take into account the strategic externality deriving
from the asymmetry in the strategic substitutability, and internalize it by playing like
symmetric rms. Thus, it seems reasonable for this equilibrium to be a focal point also
for lower levels of joint prots.
When the rms play the  strategy; each rm gets the prots i = q

i (a c qi  biqj ):
Taking into account the characterization in Remark 2, the rms set qi = q

j : We can
therefore rewrite the above expression as
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i = q

j (a  c  (1 + bi)qj ):
Notice again that with asymmetric demands the collusive quantities are still symmetric,
but the prots are not.
We now derive the equilibrium values for rm i playing D, denoting the solutions with
the superscript D. In the period of deviation, rm i solves the following maximization
problem:
max
fqDi j qj=qj g
i = (pi   c)qi = qDi (a  c  qDi   biqj )
and obtains the following per-period quantities and prots:
qDi =
(a  c  biqj )
2
(13)
Di =
(a  c  biqj )2
4
: (14)
Thus, the ow of prots for the deviating rm i is
Di = 
D
i (q

j ) +

1  
ASY
i (15)
where  2 [0; 1] is the discount rate common to i and j.
In what follows we will study the problem of collusion stability. We will rst derive
the interval of quantities of the rival rm that makes the collusion sustainable, and then
the interval of quantities on which both the rms agree to collude.
For rm i; the collusive strategy is sustainable only if Di  i (qj )=(1  ):Then, the
following lemma states for which values qi;j the collusion is stable for each single rms.
Lemma 1 The collusion is stable for rm i if and only if qCol
j
< qj < q
Col
j ;and for rm
j if and only if qCol
i
< qi < q
Col
i ; where:
qColi = (a  c)
(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] +Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
qCol
i
= (a  c)(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
qColj = (a  c)
(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] +Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
qCol
j
= (a  c)(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
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and Ai = [bi (bi(bi   2)2 + bi(b2i   b2j ) + 8(bi   bj))]
1
2 , Aj = [bj (bj(bj   2)2 + bj(b2j  
b2i ) + 8(bj   bi))]
1
2 :
Henceforth we will consider only real-valued boundaries quantities.1 We call Qi =
fqCol
i
< qi < q
Col
i g and Qj = fqColj < qj < qColj g the sets of sustainable collusion quantities
for rm i and j: As it is evident by inspection, the two interval do not coincide as long
bi 6= bj : Some collusive quantities are thus sustainable for rm i; but not for rm j. Since
it could also be the case that the two intervals do not overlap, in the following Lemma we
state when there is room for collusion among rms if the two rms are asymmetric.
Lemma 2 If bi 6= bj ; then Qi 6= Qj and Qi \Qj always exists.
The above Lemma means that there is always an interval of quantities on which the two
rms can agree to collude, and which is sustainable for both. Let us call QASY = Qi \Qj
the set of collusive quantities which are sustainable for both rm i and rm j: By contrast,
when bi = bj ; qColi = q
Col
j
= qCol and qColi = q
Col
j = q
Col, and the two sets coincide. In this
case, we call the set of collusive quantities QSYM : The following proposition characterizes
the set of collusive quantities that makes the collusion stable for each case.
Proposition 2 When:
1. bi < bj , QASY = fqColj < qi;j < qColi g;
2. bi = bj , QSYM = fqCol < q < qColg;
3. bi > bj , QASY = fqColi < qi;j < qColj g:
First, notice that setting b1 = b2 = 1; the boundary values in the above Lemma reduce
to the well known symmetric case
(9  5)(a  c)
3(9  ) < q

i;j <
a  c
3
:
Second, setting  = 0; the boundaries of the stable collusion quantities are [ a c2+bj ;
a c
2+bi
]
in case 1, and the reverse in case 2. The lower boundary is thus greater than the collusive
monopoly quantity, a c2+bj+bi . This leads to the following remark.
1When bi > bj; Ai is always positive and Aj is positive when
(8bi (8+b2i )bj+b3j )
((bj 2)2bj) < d and, in addition, to
be real valued, if bj < 13 
p
41
8
' 0; 825; it must be bi < 2(2 [(bj 2)
2(bj+1)]
1
2 )
bj
: When bi < bj; Aj is always
positive and analogous conditions can be obtained by inverting indexes.
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Remark 3 There always exist a value 0    1 such that the collusive monopoly equi-
librium is not stable.
The above remark points out that, as in the symmetric case, the monopoly quantity
is not always a feasible quantity, and when this is the case the analysis of partial collusion
thus becomes more relevant.
We proceed to answer the key research question of this paper, i.e. whether asymmetry
in the substitution e¤ects makes collusion more di¢ cult to sustain. Without qualitatively
a¤ecting our results, we normalize the parameter space by setting bj = 1   bi:We dene
the index of asymmetry as  = jbj   bij = j1   2bij:When the two values are symmetric,
bi = bj =
1
2 and  = 0; while  = 1 when one parameter is 0 and the other 1, the maximum
level of asymmetry. We then use the average value of the parameter as benchmark, and
we state the main result of this paper in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The interval of collusive quantities in the symmetric equivalent case is
always larger than the one in the asymmetric case.
The intuition behind this proposition can be understood by highlighting the strategic
interaction between the two rms. Each rm determines what is the level of production
of the other rm that makes the collusion stable for itself. When rms collude, it is
optimal for both to produce the same quantity. Then, it can immediately be seen from
(13) that, if the weak substitute wants to deviate from the agreement, he is going to
produce a lower deviation quantity with respect to the deviation quantity of the strong
substitute. The Cournot quantity in the following period is lower as well. The reason is
that a high collusion quantity raises the relative value of the deviation strategy for the weak
substitute. Analogously, a low level of the collusion quantity makes the deviating behavior
more convenient for the strong substitute. The asymmetry in the strategic substitution
e¤ect translates into asymmetric partial collusion strategies, which still overlap, but are
no longer coincident. Each rms collusive interval is shifted in opposite directions, and
only the intermediate levels of collusive quantity are supported by both rms. We can
therefore conclude that the asymmetry in the substitution e¤ect makes collusion more
di¢ cult to sustain with respect to the symmetric benchmark case.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we generalized Singh and Vives (1984) to account for asymmetry in the
substitution e¤ects, and to study its implications for implicit collusion. The rst result
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we found characterizes Cournot equilibrium: The symmetric benchmark rm equilibrium
prices, prots and quantities are lower than those of the strong, and higher than those of
the weak. The second result states that the asymmetry in the substitution e¤ects makes
partial collusion more di¢ cult to support with respect to its symmetric benchmark.
Future extensions of this model could explore the robustness of the results under
di¤erent settings and kinds of competition (e.g. Bertrand competition, semi-collusion,
R&D). Our feeling is that, in frameworks other than collusion, introducing asymmetries in
the cross-price e¤ect could lead to new theoretical insights particularly useful to empirical
analysis.
Finally, this paper suggests that the asymmetry in the substitution e¤ects is a relevant
issue when evaluating the possibility of implicit collusion among rms. If the empirical
estimations of market demands do not take into account this kind of asymmetry, it is
likely that the extent to which the rms can collude is overestimated. We thus think that
there is room for an empirical re-assessment of previous estimations, and that in this light
perhaps some anti-trust decisions could be reversed. Moreover, the theory proposed in
this paper could be usefully tested by using experimental economics methodology.
5 Appendix
5.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Part 1. By simple inspection, as long as bASYi > b
ASY
j we know that q
ASY
i < q
ASY
j : Then
it is su¢ cient to solve the inequalities qASYi < q
SE and qSE < qASYj for value of the para-
meters of the problem, that is bi;j 2 [0; 1] and a > c > 0: Part 2. From the solutions of the
symmetric and asymmetric problem it is simple to get pASYi =
a(bi 2)+[bi(bj 1)]c 2
(bibj 4) ; p
SE =
2a+(2+bi+bj)c
4+bi+bj
; pASYj =
a(bj 2)+[bj(bi 1)]c 2
(bibj 4) and analogously to Part 1 solving the corre-
sponding inequalities. Part 3. The solution to the inequality is analogous and straightfor-
ward by considering 8 and 4.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Let us consider the inequalities Di  i (qj )=(1  ); that is:
Di (q

j ) +

1  
ASY
i 
i (q

j )
1  
(a  c  biqj )2
4
+

1  
(bi   2)2(a  c)2
(bibj   4)2 
qj (a  2qj   c)
1  
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The solution of the associated equation gives the two values
qColi = (a  c)
(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] +Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
qCol
i
= (a  c)(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
where
Ai = [bi (bi(bi   2)2 + bi(b2i   b2j ) + 8(bi   bj))]
1
2 :
Inverting the indexes we obtain analogous values for rm j; that is
qColj = (a  c)
(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] +Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
qCol
j
= (a  c)(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
where
Aj = [bj (bj(bj   2)2 + bj(b2j   b2i ) + 8(bj   bi))]
1
2 :
We want the interval of collusive quantities for both rm i and j to be real valued.
When bi > bj; Ais radicand is always positive and Ajs is positive when
(8bi (8+b2i )bj+b3j )
((bj 2)2bj) <
d and, in addition, if bj < 13 
p
41
8 ' 0; 825; it must be bi <
2(2 [(bj 2)2(bj+1)]
1
2 )
bj
: When
bi < bj; Aj is always positive and analogous conditions can be obtained by inverting
indexes.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 2
Lemma 3 If bi 6= bj ; then Qi 6= Qj and Qi \Qj always exists.
We will rst show that, when bi > bj () qColj < qColi < qColj < qColi ; the second part
of the proof showing bi < bj () qColi < qColj < qColi < qColj is analogous, and can be
obtained by inverting the indexes.
Let us consider bi > bj . We rst prove that qColj < q
Col
j : This can be done solving the
inequality
(a  c)(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
< (a  c)(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] +Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
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considering the relevant range of the parameters a; bi; bj ; c; , and the conditions stated
in Lemma 1 for the quantities to be real-valued, this inequality always holds. Then, we
prove that qCol
i
< qColi : The following inequality
(a  c)(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
< (a  c)(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] +Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
always holds, considering as above the relevant range of the parameters and the con-
dition for real-values quantities. Finally, to ensure that the two intervals always overlap,
we prove that qCol
j
< qColi ; that is
(a  c)(bibj   4)[bj(   1)  2] +Aj
(bibj   4)[b2j   (2 + bj)2]
< (a  c)(bibj   4)[bi(   1)  2] Ai
(bibj   4)[b2i   (2 + bi)2]
always holds. The remaining inequalities can be derived by transitivity.
5.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Proposition 2 follows directly by Lemma 1 and 2. The two asymmetric rms can agree on
the collusive quantity belonging to the interval where the two individual partial collusion
strategies overlap.
5.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Let us normalize the parameter space by setting bj = 1   bi:Then, consider bi < bj : By
Proposition 2, qCol
i
< qi;j < q
Col
j and, since assuming positive real-valued outputs, we call
lASY = qColj  qColi the length of the set of collusive quantities in the asymmetric case, i.e.
:
lASY = (a c) (4+bi(bi 1))2[2( 15)+bi( 5+2b2i ( 1)+(12+)+bi(5 3(2+))]+2(4 bi+bi)[B1+B2]
[4+bi(bi 1)]2[(bi 3)2+(bi 1)2][b2i (2+bi)2+b2i ]
where:
B1 = [bi(bi(17  2bi + (bi   2)2   8))] 12 ,
and
B2 = [(7 +  + bi(bi(11 + 2bi + (bi   2))  20)] 12 :
In the standard equivalent case, when bi = bj = 12 ; the interval l
SE = q  q is given by
lSE = (a  c) 16
5(   25) :
Then, considering the inequality lASY > lSE , (a   c) cancel out and the resulting
inequality is veried for all the values of the parameters of the problem (bi; bj ; ) and it is
independent also from the calibration of a and c:
13
The case in which bi < bj can be proved analogously by considering the length lASY =
qColi   qColj and comparing it to lSE : The results and the proof are analogous, and can be
obtained simply by inverting indexes.
References
Berry, S., J. Levinsohn, and A. Pakes (1995). Automobile prices in market equilibrium.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society 63 (4), 841890.
Bonfrer, A., E. Berndt, and A. Silk (2006). Anomalies in Estimates of Cross-Price Elastic-
ities for Marketing Mix Models: Theory and Empirical Test. NBER Working Paper .
DAspremont, C., A. Jacquemin, J. Gabszewicz, and J. Weymark (1983). On the stability
of collusive price leadership. The Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne
dEconomique 16 (1), 1725.
Diewert, W. (1980). Symmetry conditions for market demand functions. The Review of
Economic Studies 47 (3), 595601.
Feuerstein, S. (2005). Collusion in industrial economics - A survey. Journal of Industry,
Competition and Trade 5 (3), 163198.
Friedman, J. (1971). A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames. The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies 38 (1), 112.
Kim, D. and R. Cotterill (2008). Cost pass-through in di¤erentiated product markets: the
case of us processed cheese. Journal of Industrial Economics 56 (1), 3248.
Mastroleo, M. and L. Savorelli (2009). Asymmetric substitutability and complementarity
in individual demand. MIMEO .
Rojas, C. and E. Peterson (2008). Demand for di¤erentiated products: Price and adver-
tising evidence from the US beer market. International Journal of Industrial Orga-
nization 26 (1), 288307.
Rothschild, R. (1999). Cartel stability when costs are heterogeneous. International Journal
of Industrial Organization 17 (5), 717734.
Sethuraman, R., V. Srinivasan, and D. Kim (1999). Asymmetric and neighborhood cross-
price e¤ects: some empirical generalizations. Marketing Science 18 (1), 2341.
14
Singh, N. and X. Vives (1984). Price and quantity competition in a di¤erentiated duopoly.
The RAND Journal of Economics 15 (4), 546554.
15
 
